ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4

NEW YORK TIMES 25 February 1986

U.S. Had Warnings of Manila Revolt

By GERALD M. BOYD

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 — White House officials said today that, based on United States intelligence reports, the Administration had reason to believe as early as last Thursday that a potential revolt by some Philippine military officers was in the works.

The officials provided the detail as they recounted the hectic last few days that concluded with a pointed, predawn statement today in which the United States for the first time urged the Philippine President, Ferdinand E.

Marcos, to resign.

Aides to Mr. Reagan said the statement was the last act of a drama that began to accelerate Thursday, when the intelligence reports were received. The officials said that they did not know whether the reports were the result of direct contacts between special Presidential envoy Philip C. Habib or other United States officials and the two Philippine officials — Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Lieut. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, the Deputy Chief of Staff — who on Saturday resigned their Government posts, took control of the Defense Ministry and called on Mr. Marcos to resign — an action that put the White House in a crisis mode.

Move By Ver Prompted Revolt

A White House official said intelligence sources reported earlier last week that a key Marcos loyalist, Gen. Fabian C. Ver, the armed forces Chief of Staff, had summoned military forces from outside Manila to come into the city, potentially to arrest figures opposed to Mr. Marcos.

"We had word and they had word of a potential roundup of anti-Marcos people and that's what prompted them to move when they did," the official said, referring to the rebel leaders."

As the weekend progressed, a consensus developed among top Reagan foreign policy and national security aides that not only would Mr. Marcos have to leave, but also that the White House would have to say as much.

The decision, eventually agreed to by President Reagan after telephone conversation with two top advisers at 5 a.m. Monday, capped a series of round-the-clock discussions held in the White House Situation Room, the office of Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, Mr. Reagan's national security adviser, and the Bethesda. Md., home of Secre-

tary of State George P. Shultz.

While one senior aide said the White House operated on a condition of "enhanced alert" beginning on Friday, many aides left work Friday in a sort of business-as-usual mode, with Mr. Reagan taking a helicopter to the Presidential retreat at Camp David, Md., and Larry Speakes, the White House spokesman, flying to Mississippi to attend the funeral of a former boss, Senator James O. Eastland.

'Situation Deteriorating'

The pace within the White House accelerated considerably on Saturday after first reports of the action by Mr. Enrile and General Ramos. One senior Reagan aide said the development was viewed within the White House as creating an environment in which "the situation was deteriorating rapidly" amid uncertainty over what the Philippine military would do.

Other senior Reagan aides said the news prompted Admiral Poindexter to convene the first of several meetings in his office that were attended by Mr. Shultz and Michael H. Armacost, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and a former Ambassador to the Philippines. The group conferred by telephone with Donald T. Regan, the White House Chief of Staff, and then Mr. Poindexter briefed Mr. Reagan at Camp David by phone, officials said. The officials decided to conduct a

The officials decided to conduct a meeting through a telephone conference call that afternoon. This particular session included Mr. Reagan, Mr. Regan, Admiral Poindexter, Mr. Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger.

Officials said the meeting was important in producing a consensus on the need for the first of increasingly direct hints to Mr. Marcos. In this instance, the statement said that Mr. Enrile had declared that he had personal knowlege of vote-rigging on a massive scale in the Feb. 7 election.

Turning Point in White House

One aide to Mr. Reagan said the statement was a turning point in the growing belief among Mr. Reagan's aides that Mr. Marcos should resign.

"It was a turning point because Enrile had stated his personal knowledge of vote-rigging and fraud and it reinforced our concern about fraud undermining the legitimacy of the election," the aide said.

The activity within the White House

accelerated on Sunday when Mr. Habib returned from his special mission to Manila on behalf of Mr. Reagan. Mr. Habib and Mr. Shultz met that morning at Mr. Shultz's home to prepare for a National Security Council meeting scheduled that afternoon at the White House and the group later conferred with Mr. Regan by telephone.

At the 90-minute National Security Council meeting, the President was briefed by by William J. Casey, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and by Mr. Weinberger, Mr. Habib and Mr. Shultz.

Officials present at the session said that the first reports they received as the meeting began were that troops loyal to Mr. Marcos were preparing to move against anti-Marcos forces in about 90 minutes.

"It was an escalating thing and we were constantly updating our options in the course of changing events," said one senior Reagan aide.

The aide said that at one point, the White House had drafted language noting that Mr. Marcos had threatened violence, but by the time the meeting had finished some violence had already erupted, so that phrase was dropped, he said.

At another point in the meeting, the aide said, Mr. Reagan remarked that Mr. Marcos had to be "approached carefully."

"We have to ask him rather than tell him," the aide quoted the President as saying.

The meeting produced a second statement that threatened the Philippine leader with an immediate cutoff of American military aid unless he avoided the use of force against those calling for his resignation.

Officials said that United States intelligence information throughout the evening prompted increased concern as reports indicated that troops loyal to Mr. Marcos were about to move against the rebel forces. "We figured that we had better get something out quickly," said a senior adviser.

Admiral Poindexter, after attending a White House dinner for the nation's governors, monitored events through the evening and eventually reached Mr. Regan. The two agreed on the need for a third statement, in effect calling upon President Marcos to resign.

Aides said that the two had agreed on the statement and conferred with Mr. Reagan at about 5 a.m. 0

जारक Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/05 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000100680025-3